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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 13-3880
____________
WILLIE L. DAVIS,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN J.E. THOMAS, in his individual capacity;
DEPUTY CAPTAIN B. TAGGART, in his individual capacity
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-02181)
District Judge: Robert D. Mariani
__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 6, 2014
Before:

FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 10, 2014)
____________
OPINION
____________

PER CURIAM
Appellant Willie Davis, a state prisoner, appeals from an order of the District
Court granting summary judgment to the defendants. For the reasons that follow, we will
summarily affirm.
Davis, who is housed in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) at the United
States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, suffers from asthma. On January 12,

2012, pepper spray (Oleoresin Capsicum) was used to subdue another inmate; Davis was
affected and suffered an asthma attack. He was taken to the prison Health Services and
treated successfully. Following this episode, Davis submitted an informal request to staff
asking that a sign be placed on his cell door instructing staff to remove him from the area
before pepper spray is used in the SMU. According to Davis, Health Services
Administrator S. Brown ignored his request. In February, 2012, Davis submitted a
grievance to Warden Bledsoe. Warden Bledsoe also denied his request that a sign be
placed on his cell door, and noted that Davis had been treated by the health services staff
following the January, 2012 incident. Warden Bledsoe advised Davis to take any future
medical concerns to the medical personnel who were treating him. Several months later,
on June 8, 2012, Davis suffered another asthma attack when pepper spray was used in the
SMU.
On July 6, 2012, Davis filed a Bivens1 action in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, see Davis v. Brown, D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-01294,
against Administrator Brown and Warden Bledsoe, alleging that they violated his rights
under the Eighth Amendment because they refused his request that in the future he be
removed from his cell prior to the use of pepper spray in the SMU. In an order entered
on May 20, 2013, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Davis
appealed, and we affirmed, holding that summary judgment was proper because
defendant-administrators cannot be considered deliberately indifferent simply because
they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already
being treated by the prison doctor. See Davis v. Brown, --- Fed. App. ---, 2014 WL
1

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
2

702367, at *3 (3d Cir. February 25, 2014). We emphasized the limited nature of our
holding, stating that “Davis chose to file the instant Bivens action against two officials
who were not treating him for his asthma . . . [following having] exhausted his
administrative remedies only with respect to the first asthma attack and the defendants’
response to it.” Id. at *4. We further concluded that “the sum total of the allegations in
[Davis’] complaint do not support any actionable claims that have merit.” Id.
Meanwhile, on November 1, 2012, Davis filed another Bivens action , this time
against the new warden, Warden J.E. Thomas, and one Captain B. Taggart, both in their
individual capacities. Davis alleged an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
specifically with respect to the June 8, 2012 incident. In his complaint, Davis asserted
that, after this second asthma attack, he sought an informal resolution of his problem
from Captain Taggart on June 18, 2012. Davis claimed that he asked Captain Taggart for
a transfer to “a clean air environment.” Captain Taggart denied the request and Davis
appealed to Warden Thomas. On July 25, 2012, Warden Thomas rejected Davis’ request
for an administrative remedy. On July 30, 2012, Davis was again exposed to pepper
spray when correctional officers arrived in G-Block to extract an inmate. He claimed that
he suffered an asthma attack, and that it took 30 minutes of his cellmate kicking on the
cell door before he was able to get medical attention. During this time, Davis used his
inhaler, but the pepper spray in the air, which had not dispersed, rendered his inhaler
ineffective, he claimed. Davis alleged that because Captain Taggart and Warden Thomas
did not provide the administrative remedy he sought after the June 8, 2012 incident, they
failed to protect him from his July 25, 2012 asthma attack and thus were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. In addition, Davis claimed that the defendants’
3

failure to grant him an administrative remedy was in retaliation for his having filed his
original lawsuit. Davis sought money damages.
Shortly after he filed this complaint, Davis filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(a), claiming that he had again been exposed to pepper
spray on October 16, 2012, and had again required medical treatment. Among other
things, Davis asked that he be evaluated by an independent medical specialist, and he
asked to be transferred to a different institution. In opposing Davis’ motion, the
defendants submitted an affidavit from Dr. Andrew Edinger, a Bureau of Prisons
physician who had reviewed Davis’ medical records. In his affidavit, Dr. Edinger
explained that Davis suffers from moderately persistent asthma. He is prescribed a first
line therapy regimen consisting of an albuterol inhaler, and a steroid inhaler
(Mometasone Furoate), with instructions to use two puffs, two times per day. He is
permitted to have both inhalers in his possession. Based on Davis’ prescription refill
history, it appeared to Dr. Edinger that Davis was noncompliant with his first line therapy
regimen. Dr. Edinger explained that, for Davis’ medication to be effective, he would
have to take it as prescribed. Dr. Edinger also explained that exposure to pepper spray
can cause an asthma sufferer to feel like his throat is tightening. Dr. Edinger explained
that Davis received treatment on several occasions for wheezing associated with the
disbursement of pepper spray in the area of his cell, including the use of steroid injection,
nebulizer breathing treatment (a mist form of medication disbursement) and/or Ativan to
treat anxiety. Dr. Edinger expressed the view that at no time was Davis’ health at serious
risk of harm as a result of exposure to pepper spray, and that there was no medical reason
to transfer him out of the SMU.
4

In addition to Dr. Edinger’s affidavit, the defendants submitted a progress note
written by Dr. Kevin Pigos, which indicated that, on November 28, 2012, Davis was seen
at the prison Health Services and he requested a transfer away from the SMU. Medical
personnel performed a peak flow test, which measures the amount of air flowing out of
the lungs. The results of this test were in the normal range. Dr. Pigos noted that Davis
likely was noncompliant with his steroid inhaler, although he used albuterol daily. Dr.
Pigos wrote in his assessment that he had attempted to explain to Davis that asthma is a
disease of the lower airways, whereas pepper spray is an upper airway irritant. Dr Pigos
wrote that he encouraged Davis to take his medications as prescribed, and wrote that
there was no need to transfer Davis to a medical facility or a pepper spray-free unit.
The Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and Recommendation, recommending
that the motion for preliminary injunctive relief be denied. After setting forth the
contents of Dr. Edinger’s affidavit, the Magistrate Judge concluded that preliminary
injunctive relief was unwarranted. The District Court, in an order entered on March 7,
2013, adopted the report and denied Davis’ Rule 65(a) motion.2
In the meantime, the defendants moved to dismiss Davis’ complaint, or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. In support of their motion, Warden Thomas and
Captain Taggart submitted Dr. Edinger’s affidavit and the progress note/assessment from
Davis’ November 28, 2012 visit to the prison health services. In the main, Warden
Thomas and Captain Taggart asserted that they had no personal involvement in Davis’
medical care and thus were not liable to him for money damages. Davis opposed this
motion, and he submitted a motion of his own for summary judgment. The Magistrate
2

Davis did not timely appeal this decision. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Fed. R. App.
4(a)(1)(B).
5

Judge recommended that summary judgment be awarded to the defendants. Again, the
Magistrate Judge credited Dr. Edinger’s affidavit and his opinion that at no time was
Davis’ health at serious risk of harm as a result of exposure to pepper spray, and that
there was no medical reason to transfer him out of the SMU. The Magistrate Judge also
concluded that Warden Thomas and Captain Taggart did nothing more than defer to the
judgment of medical professionals in responding to the June 8, 2012 incident. Although
the Magistrate Judge thought that the doctrine of res judicata applied to bar this action,3
he eventually concluded that “more fundamentally, Davis’ claims failed “just as they
did in his prior lawsuit because he failed to show that the defendants knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to his safety. Report and Recommendation, at 15. The
Magistrate Judge reasoned that deliberate indifference is not shown where supervisory
correctional staff do not respond to the medical complaints of a prisoner who is already
being treated by prison medical staff. Davis submitted objections to the Report and
Recommendation. In an order entered on September 4, 2013, the District Court overruled
the objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation, and granted summary judgment
to the defendants.
Davis appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our Clerk granted
him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that the appeal was subject to

3

We seriously doubt whether the doctrine of res judicata bars this action because it
involves a different incident and different defendants and because a claim of deliberate
indifference turns on whether the specific defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Deliberate indifference is a
subjective standard under Farmer – the prison official-defendant must actually have
known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel,
256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
6

summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third
Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Summary
judgment is proper where the summary judgment record “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one that could change
the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). We review a District Court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir.
2007).
To establish deliberate indifference, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976), a prison official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to the
inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To state a
constitutional claim, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference. See id. Davis’ Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference rested on
an allegation that Warden Thomas and Captain Taggart failed to protect him from the
July 30, 2012 asthma attack by failing to take any protective action after being notified of
the June, 2012 asthma attack. Summary judgment for the defendants was proper here
because the summary judgment record establishes that the defendants did not act with a
7

sufficiently culpable state of mind, that is, with deliberate indifference to Davis’ serious
medical needs.
Correctional defendant-administrators who are not themselves physicians cannot
“be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to
the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.”
See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). In Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004), we held that, “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts
. . ., a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner
is in capable hands.” If the non-medical prison official has no actual knowledge that
prison doctors are mistreating a prisoner, he or she “will not be chargeable with the
Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Id. Davis did not
show that the defendants’ involvement in the matter consisted of anything more than
reviewing his grievance and deferring to the judgment of medical personnel, and, as a
threshold matter, he failed to establish that medical personnel were mistreating his
asthma condition. The defendants showed through competent medical evidence that his
asthma condition was not so serious that he could never be near the use of pepper spray,
or that he risked serious damage to his future health if exposed to second-hand pepper
spray. Davis’ personal opinion to the contrary will not suffice to defeat the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587.
As before, we further conclude that the sum total of the allegations in Davis’
complaint do not support any actionable claims that have merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District
Court granting summary judgment to the defendants.
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